Introduction:
Luis Alberto de Herrera (1873–1959), a central figure in Uruguayan politics during the first half of the 20th century, was a strategist whose diplomatic vision and negotiation skills defined not only the direction of his party (the National Party) but also Uruguay’s international stance in the face of a transforming world.
A lawyer, journalist, and statesman, Herrera combined deep-rooted nationalism with sharp pragmatism, defending Uruguayan sovereignty in a context of imperialist pressures, global conflicts, and geopolitical shifts. This article explores the principles that guided his international thought and action, highlighting how his legacy influenced Uruguay’s diplomatic identity and the balance of power in Latin America.

Historical Context: Uruguay Between Batllismo and Imperialism:
To understand Herrera, it is essential to place him in the Uruguay of the early 20th century, marked by:

• The Batllista model: Under the leadership of José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903–1907; 1911–1915), Uruguay consolidated itself as a laboratory of social and secular reforms, but also as a centralist state with marked socialist tendencies, which Herrera criticized from a conservative nationalist perspective.
• External pressures: The country faced British economic interests in its railways, American influence in Latin America aiming to displace British power—especially after the end of World War II—and territorial ambitions from Brazil and Argentina.
• Global circumstances: The two World Wars and the early Cold War required Uruguay to define its position within a polarized international system.

In this setting, Herrera emerged as a critical voice against interventionism and a defender of an independent foreign policy.

Fundamental Principles of Herrerist Diplomacy:

A) National Sovereignty as an Absolute Value:
For Herrera, sovereignty was non-negotiable. He rejected any agreement that compromised Uruguay’s political, economic, or cultural autonomy:

• Opposition to instrumentalized Pan-Americanism: He criticized U.S.-led Pan-American conferences, seeing them as mechanisms of domination. In 1923, at the Santiago de Chile Conference, he denounced Pan-Americanism as a tool “to subordinate the weak under the aegis of the strong.”
• Unwavering defense of neutrality: During both World Wars, he advocated for Uruguay to remain neutral, resisting pressure from both the Allies and the Axis powers.

B) Non-Intervention and Self-Determination:
Herrera was a pioneer in applying the principle of non-intervention, anticipating Mexico’s Estrada Doctrine (1930):

• Criticism of U.S. intervention in Central America and the Caribbean: He condemned the occupation of Nicaragua (1912–1933) and the protectorate in Cuba, arguing they violated international law.
• Support for legitimate governments: During the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), he defended the right of the Republican government not to be intervened upon by fascist powers.

C) Critical Latin Americanism:
Though skeptical of U.S.-led Pan-Americanism, Herrera promoted Latin American unity based on shared interests:

• Solidarity with Paraguay during the Chaco War (1932–1935): Uruguay, under his influence, mediated the conflict and supported Paraguayan sovereignty against Bolivia.
• Cultural diplomacy: He promoted the creation of institutions such as the Uruguayan-Argentine Cultural Institute (1940) to strengthen regional ties without subordination to extracontinental powers.

D) Economic Pragmatism and Resource Defense:
Herrera understood that political independence required economic autonomy:

• Nationalization of public services: He supported the state takeover of railways and ports to reduce dependence on British capital.
• Selective protectionism: He promoted tariffs to protect national industry, though without isolating the country from global trade.

Realpolitik in Bilateral Relations
Although idealistic in principles, Herrera was flexible in practice:

• Relations with Brazil and Argentina: He negotiated border and trade agreements while avoiding alignment with either, maintaining Uruguay as a balanced “buffer state.”
• Dialogue with extracontinental powers: In the 1930s, he explored trade agreements with Germany and Italy to counter Anglo-American influence, without endorsing their totalitarian ideologies.

Case Studies: Herrerist Diplomacy in Action

A) The 1923 Crisis: Herrera vs. Pan-Americanism
At the Pan-American Conference in Santiago de Chile (1923), Herrera, as Uruguay’s delegate, opposed the creation of an Inter-American Court of Justice promoted by the U.S., arguing it would undermine the legal sovereignty of small countries. His speech, remembered as “the defense of the weak,” marked a milestone in resistance to regional hegemonism.

B) Neutrality in World War II
While President Alfredo Baldomir (1943–1947) broke relations with the Axis under U.S. pressure, Herrera criticized the move from the Senate:
“Neutrality is a shield, not a surrender”: He argued that siding with the Allies would expose Uruguay to economic reprisals and a loss of autonomy.
Subsequent impact: His stance influenced Uruguay to maintain practical neutrality, trading with both sides until 1945.

C) The Fight Against Economic Imperialism
In 1942, he led the opposition to a trade treaty with the U.S. that forced Uruguay to buy obsolete machinery in exchange for wool exports. After months of debate, he succeeded in renegotiating clauses, securing fair prices and technology transfer.

Herrera and the Cold War: Anti-Communism Without Alignment
At the dawn of the Cold War, Herrera adopted a unique stance:

• Rejection of communism: He saw it as a threat to national identity and private property.
• Skepticism toward U.S. alignment: He criticized the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR, 1947), arguing it would turn Uruguay into “just another soldier in the North American army.”
• Defense of active non-alignment: He proposed that Uruguay lead a bloc of neutral countries in Latin America—an idea that anticipated the Non-Aligned Movement (1961).

Legacy and Criticism: Between Nationalism and Isolationism

A) Influence on Uruguayan Foreign Policy:

• Doctrine of non-intervention: His ideas permeated Uruguay’s foreign policy, evident in its opposition to the Bay of Pigs invasion (1961) and its vote against Cuba’s expulsion from the OAS (1962).
• Model of active neutrality: Uruguay maintained diplomatic relations with various regimes during the Cold War—from Castro’s Cuba to apartheid South Africa—prioritizing commercial interests over ideologies.

B) Criticism and Contradictions:

• Tolerance of Latin American dictatorships: Although anti-imperialist, he was ambiguous toward authoritarian regimes like Vargas’ in Brazil, prioritizing regional stability.
• Short-sighted economic nationalism: Some analysts argue his protectionism slowed Uruguay’s industrial modernization.

C) Herrera in the 21st Century:
His defense of sovereignty resonates in current debates:

• Free trade agreements: His warnings about asymmetries in negotiations with powerful countries echo in current criticisms of Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance.
• Regional integration vs. globalization: His critical Latin Americanism inspires movements that reject neoliberalism without falling into isolationism.

Conclusion: Sovereigntism as a Diplomatic Art
Luis Alberto de Herrera was not a drawing-room theorist, but a negotiator who understood that diplomacy is the art of protecting what is essential without closing doors. In a world where major powers sought to redraw maps and spheres of influence, he managed to turn Uruguay—a small country—into an actor with its own voice.
His legacy, more than a set of rigid principles, is a method: analyze each situation through the lens of national identity, negotiate without submission, and remember that in foreign policy, there are no permanent allies, only permanent interests. As he himself declared: “Independence is not given; it is defended.” In that maxim, Uruguay found a path, and Latin America, a mirror in which it can still see itself.
Herrera was a puzzle of complex conceptions that had to be harmonized: nationalist yet cosmopolitan, traditionalist yet modernizing. His greatest lesson is that coherence in foreign policy is not about following a manual, but about defending—cleverly and bravely—that which makes a nation unique.

The Defense of National Identity
Herrera saw culture as a front of resistance against imperialist homogenization:

• Promotion of historical revisionism: He supported reinterpretations of the past that highlighted national figures like Artigas, presenting him as a symbol of independence from Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro.
• Protection of the gaucho as an icon: He opposed policies that sought to “Europeanize” the countryside, defending rural traditions such as folklore and the payada.

Relations with the Catholic Church
Although a secularist, Herrera negotiated with the Church to gain support against anti-clerical Batllismo:

• Concordat of 1940: He supported agreements that returned ecclesiastical properties, securing the backing of conservative sectors.

Herrera and the Labor Movement
His relationship with unions was ambivalent:

• Support for rural labor demands: He mediated in conflicts involving ranch hands, seeking to prevent leftist radicalization.
• Rejection of anarchism and communism: He persecuted unions influenced by foreign ideologies, prioritizing “national identity” over class struggle.

Herrera in Washington, the Chaco War, and World War II

Diplomatic Mission in Washington: Defending Sovereignty at the Empire’s Court
Luis Alberto de Herrera served as Uruguay’s plenipotentiary minister in Washington from 1919 to 1921, a critical period during which the United States emerged as a global power after World War I. His mission was not ceremonial, but a trench from which he defended Uruguayan interests against rising American economic and political imperialism.

a) Trade Negotiations and the Specter of Pan-Americanism:
Herrera arrived in Washington when Pan-Americanism, promoted by President Woodrow Wilson, sought to consolidate U.S. hemispheric leadership. From the outset, he adopted a critical stance:

• Opposition to interference in internal affairs: He rejected American proposals to standardize tariff policies across Latin America, arguing they violated Uruguay’s economic sovereignty.
• Defense of the Batllista model: In response to criticism from U.S. conservative sectors regarding Batlle y Ordóñez’s social reforms, Herrera publicly defended Uruguay’s labor legislation as “a beacon of justice in an unequal continent.”

b) The Montevideo Port Case:
In 1920, Herrera successfully negotiated with the U.S. State Department to prevent American companies from monopolizing the modernization of the Port of Montevideo. He secured a mixed agreement in which Uruguay retained 51% of the shares, setting a precedent against foreign exploitation of strategic infrastructure.
Famous quote: “We do not sell pieces of the Fatherland; we rent tools to build it.”

c) Relations with the U.S. Congress:
Herrera cultivated ties with isolationist senators, such as William Borah, to counteract Rooseveltian interventionism. His strategy was to present Uruguay as a reliable trade partner, but not a subordinate one.

The Chaco War (1932–1935): Uruguay as Mediator and Herrera as Strategist
Although the Chaco War pitted Paraguay and Bolivia against each other for control of an arid region rich in oil, Uruguay—under Herrera’s influence—played a key role as a neutral mediator.

a) Peace Diplomacy in a Bloody Conflict
Herrera, from the Senate and the press, promoted Uruguay’s stance:

• Active neutrality: Uruguay offered its territory (in Punta del Este) for peace negotiations in 1933, although the conference failed due to Bolivia’s intransigence.
• Tacit support for Paraguay: Herrera sympathized with Paraguay’s cause, recalling the historical alliance against Brazil and Argentina in the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870). However, he kept Uruguay as an impartial facilitator.

b) The 1935 Peace Protocol
When the League of Nations failed to stop the war, Uruguay—along with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—joined the ABCP Mediators Group. Herrera pushed for the final agreement to ensure:

• Boundaries defined by international arbitration, not by force.
• Protection of indigenous rights in the Chaco region, a pioneering demand at the time.
  The 1938 Peace Treaty, which granted 75% of the Chaco to Paraguay, reflected his vision that “borders are drawn with ink, not blood.”

The Chaco War: Between the Desert and Diplomacy
In the 1930s, as the world plunged into the Great Depression, another conflict erupted in the heart of South America: the Chaco War, where Paraguay and Bolivia bled for an arid territory rumored to hide rivers of oil. Herrera, from his podium in the Uruguayan Senate, saw this conflict as both an opportunity and a danger. The opportunity: positioning Uruguay as a neutral mediator in a scenario where even the League of Nations was failing. The danger: that Brazil or Argentina’s ambitions could turn the Chaco into a new battlefield for influence.
Under his influence, Uruguay offered its Punta del Este beaches for peace negotiations. Herrera didn’t limit himself to offering land; he wove alliances. He knew that Paraguay, still wounded by the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870), distrusted its larger neighbors. Therefore, he built a network of discreet supports: sending Uruguayan doctors to Asunción, pressuring Montevideo’s press to narrate Paraguay’s suffering, and in the shadows, ensuring that Brazilian ships carrying weapons didn’t cross the Río de la Plata.
When the Peace Protocol was signed in 1935, Herrera didn’t celebrate. He knew that borders drawn on maps didn’t heal ancient hatreds. But he had achieved something greater: Uruguay, without armies or oil, had been heard. “In the Chaco desert,” he wrote, “we planted a tree called mediation. May it give shade to those who will come.”

World War II: Neutrality as Shield and Sword
By 1942, the world was burning. German tanks advanced on Stalingrad, Japanese planes bombed Pearl Harbor, and the United States demanded loyalty. In Uruguay, dictator-president Alfredo Baldomir, under pressure, severed relations with the Axis. Herrera, from his seat in the Senate, raised his voice like thunder: “Neutrality is not cowardice; it is the shield of those who don’t want to be cannon fodder.”
His stance was not simple obstinacy. Herrera saw the war as an empire game where Uruguay, once again, risked its autonomy. Why send soldiers to die in Europe if the Río de la Plata already had its own ghosts? He remembered the Graf Spee incident: in 1939, the German battleship, cornered by the British fleet, sought refuge in Montevideo. The Uruguayan government, under pressure from London, gave Captain Hans Langsdorff 72 hours to depart. Herrera supported the decision, but when the ship sank off the coast, he saw the gesture as a premonition: “We are forced spectators of other people’s tragedies,” he lamented.
During the war, Herrera negotiated in the shadows. He accepted that Uruguay would export wool to the Allies but protected companies with German owners. “The enemy is not in our ports,” he argued, “but in losing ourselves.” When in 1945 Uruguay declared war on the Axis—a symbolic gesture—he was already planning the future: “Peace will come, and with it, new masters. It is our task to ensure that we are not bought.”

Herrera’s Position During World War II: One of the Most Controversial and Consistent with His Sovereignty Ideals

a) Criticism of Breaking Relations with the Axis
In 1942, dictator-president General Alfredo Baldomir—under pressure from the U.S.—severed diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan. Herrera, from the Senate, led the opposition:

• Strategic arguments: He warned that aligning with the Allies would expose Uruguay to German submarine attacks and the loss of European markets.
• Moral arguments: He denounced the hypocrisy of the U.S., which demanded loyalty while maintaining internment camps for Japanese-Americans.

b) Practical Neutrality vs. Ideological Neutrality
Although Uruguay declared war on the Axis in 1945 (under constitutional President Juan José de Amézaga), Herrera ensured the country maintained de facto neutrality:

• Controlled trade with both sides: Uruguay exported wool and meat to the U.S., but avoided sanctions on companies with German ties, such as the Norteña brewery, owned by German-Uruguayan immigrants.
• Protection of Axis citizens: He refused to extradite German and Italian refugees unless war crimes were proven.

c) The Graf Spee Incident
In 1939, the German battleship Admiral Graf Spee took refuge in Montevideo after the Battle of the Río de la Plata. Herrera supported the government’s decision to give Captain Hans Langsdorff 72 hours to depart under British pressure. However, he criticized the subsequent destruction of the ship, seeing it as a surrender to foreign interests:
“The Río de la Plata is not a stage for European tragedies.”

Legacy of Sovereign Diplomacy
Herrera’s interventions in these three fronts—Washington, the Chaco, and the Second World War—reveal a common thread: the conviction that a small country can be an actor, not a spectator, on the global stage.
In Washington, he demonstrated that intellectual firmness can balance power asymmetry.
In the Chaco, he proved that neutral mediation does not imply passivity, but ethical leadership.
In the Second World War, he defended that neutrality is not cowardice, but a strategic calculation to preserve independence.

The Art of Negotiating from the Periphery
Herrera did not have armies or oil, but he used what he had: intelligence, audacity, and an unwavering belief in Uruguay’s sovereignty. In an era when powers believed the world was divided between the strong and the weak, he reminded us that even the smallest can negotiate if it understands its strengths. As he wrote in El Uruguay Internacional (1930): “Our flag is not large in territory, but it is immense in dignity.” This dignity, defended in Washington, in the Chaco, and in the dark years of the war, is his enduring legacy.
When Luis Alberto de Herrera arrived in Washington in 1919, the U.S. capital was filled with the triumphant air of an emerging power. World War I had solidified the United States as a global arbiter, and its economic influence stretched over Latin America like an invisible web. Herrera, with his impeccable suit and hawk-like gaze, was not dazzled. He knew that his mission was not to win favors but to defend Uruguay—a small, yet proud country—in the court of the new empire. In diplomatic receptions, where champagne flowed and European accents mixed with northern ambitions, Herrera spoke of sovereignty. Not as a shout, but as a reminder: “Nations are not measured by their size, but by their dignity.”
His most emblematic battle in Washington was for the port of Montevideo. U.S. companies, eager to control maritime routes, were pressuring to monopolize its modernization. Herrera, instead of rejecting foreign investment, domesticated it. He negotiated an agreement where Uruguay retained 51% of the shares. “We do not sell pieces of the homeland,” he declared to the press, “we lease tools to build it.” The message was clear: progress did not require surrendering flags. Years later, that port would become a symbol of economic independence that Herrera defended as a sacred duty.

Legacy: The Art of Being Small in a World of Giants
Herrera died in 1959, but his ghost continues to roam Uruguayan diplomacy. In every free trade agreement discussed, in every debate about neutrality in foreign conflicts, his voice resonates: “Negotiating is not conceding; it is exchanging without selling out.”
Today, when powers vie for the lithium of the Andes or the soybeans of the Pampas, Uruguay continues to apply its tacit manual: speak clearly, act prudently, and remember that, on the global board, even a pawn can deliver checkmate if it knows its worth. Herrera had no armies or oil, but he had something more powerful: the certainty that sovereignty is not inherited, it is defended. And in that defense, Uruguay found its place in the world.